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DYNAMIC REGULATION TO CURTAIL EXCESSIVE
CORPORATE RISK-TAKING—A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR SCHWARCZ
Wulf A. Kaal*
In his article Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal
Blame, Professor Steven Schwarcz evaluates “the extent to which corporate
risk-taking should be regarded as excessive, and the extent to which personal
liability should be used to control that excessive risk-taking.”1 Professor
Schwarcz succinctly identifies the shortcomings of the existing regulatory
infrastructure in the context of risk-taking by pointing out that “corporate
governance law “already covers, and subjects managers to personal liability for
engaging in, certain types of excessive risk-taking. But it does not cover the
type of risk-taking that led to the financial crisis and that is becoming ever
more common—risk-taking that could have systemic consequences to the
financial system.”2 Further, he evaluates the adequacy of firm-level liability
and concludes that “firm-level liability may well be insufficient—and almost
certainly will be inefficient—to deter excessive risk-taking and prevent another
financial crisis.”3 Professor Schwarcz’s point is as unmistakable as it is
insightful and provocative: “Managers engaging in excessive corporate risktaking should . . . also be subjected to personal liability.”4
While Professor Schwarcz’s main points are of course well taken, and he
certainly makes a tremendous contribution to the literature on excessive risktaking by executives, a key assumption underlying most of the proposals
Professor Schwarcz analyzes is that rules could and should be optimally
tailored to address a perceived regulatory problem.5 In an environment of
exponentially increasing disruptive innovation, such assumptions may not be
*

Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis).
Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal Blame, 65 EMORY
L.J. 533, 533 (2015).
2 Id. at 578.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 578–79 (“[C]orporate governance law should require managers to assess the impact of risktaking on the public as well as on investors . . . . This Article also analyzes the extent to which managers
performing this public governance duty should be protected by the business judgment rule. . . . This Article
also examines how managers who breach their public governance duty by engaging in excessive corporate
risk-taking should be sued.”).
1
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justified.6 In fact, the assumption that stable and optimal rules are a necessary
and adequate remedy in many ways supports and perpetuates excessive risktaking by executives, financial crises, and financial regulatory cycles. A key
role for scholarship in this context could be the evaluation of supplemental
governance mechanisms that help the main regulatory framework adapt to
constantly changing market environments, disruptive (financial) innovation,
and the regulatory environment.
Exponentially increasing disruptive innovation in fintech, among other
sectors, calls into question the use of stable and presumptively optimal rules in
governance.7 Disruptive technological innovation can be characterized by the
emergence of completely new technologies, the new combination and
application of existing technologies, and the application of new technologies
to specific societal problem areas, each precipitating a significant paradigm
shift for product technology or creating entirely new paradigms.8 The literature
on management has studied the implications of disruptive technologies and
innovation since the mid-1990s.9 Successful disruptive products of the last
fifteen years shared core characteristics that were facilitated by growth and
advancement in disruptive technologies. Big data is a significant driver of
disruptive innovation.10 Similarly, the exponential development of artificial
intelligence and the associated disruptive innovation pose substantial
challenges for policy makers in education, financial markets, labor markets,
and other areas.11
6 See Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation, in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, BUSINESS &
INNOVATION (Mark Fenwick et al. eds., forthcoming 2016).
7 Id.
8 Ronald N. Kostoff, Robert Boylan & Gene R. Simmons, Disruptive Technology Roadmaps, 71
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 141, 142 (2004); Steven T. Walsh & Jonathan D. Linton,
Infrastructure for Emergent Industries Based on Discontinuous Innovations, 12 ENGINEERING MGMT. J. 23, 24
exhibit 1 (2000).
9 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE
GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997); see also GEOFFREY A. MOORE, CROSSING THE CHASM (1991).
10 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013). The idea of N=All, facilitated by big data, allows
researchers to understand correlations that are completely unprecedented and to revolutionize our world. See
id.
11 See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND
PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 205–28 (2014) (discussing policy in face of projected
automation of low-skill labor); Tess Townsend, Peter Diamandis: A.I. Will Lead to Massive Disruption Across
Industries, INC. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/diamandis-artificial-intelligence.html
(“He said self-driving cars will render car insurance and the need for more roads obsolete. He anticipates his
children will never drive. He projected that advances in camera technology will lead to cameras woven into
clothes, biometric sensing will ‘“massively disrupt’” medicine, and satellites will be able to watch raw
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In my own work, I have suggested that dynamic elements in regulation can
help address many of the shortcomings of the existing regulatory framework
associated with disruptive innovation.12 Dynamic regulation as a supplemental
governance mechanism and rule optimization strategy could help address some
of the shortcomings of the existing regulatory approach and its reliance on
stable and presumptively optimal rules. Through dynamic elements in
regulation, rulemaking could become more than a mere reactive process. The
increasing utilization of institution specific decentralized information,
reflecting preceding events and attempting to anticipate succeeding future
contingencies in a dynamic framework, could help heighten the adaptive
capabilities of financial regulation.13
Through its anticipatory and adaptive features, dynamic regulation could
help dampen excessive risk-taking by executives. Dynamic elements in
financial regulation could help support regulators in their efforts to continually
adapt to financial innovation and new market environments. Dynamic elements
in financial regulation may enable regulation to more accurately trace
developments that may lead to excessive risk taking and financial crises. By
changing the timing, availability and quality of information, and the emphasis
of regulation,14 dynamic elements in financial regulation could help anticipate
and preempt excessive risk taking and associated financial crises. A mixture of
mandatory rules, market solutions, and private ordering could help increase the
adaptive capabilities of rulemaking, curtail the effects of the collective action
problem of rulemaking, and dampen financial regulatory cycles.
Dynamic regulation can be more than a mere theoretical concept. If
combined with existing stable and presumptively optimal rules in the existing
regulatory framework and rulemaking process, dynamic governance
mechanisms could become part of a dynamic optimization and
supplementation process for rulemaking.15 More specifically, dynamic

materials entering factories and finished products leaving them, enabling smart AI to extract financial
performance data ahead of the markets.”).
12 See Kaal, supra note 6; see also Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New
Institutional Economics Framework, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER (Wulf Kaal, Matthias
Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2014) [hereinafter Kaal, Evolution of Law]; Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic
Regulation of the Financial Services Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 791 (2013); Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy
A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from
2003–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61 (2015).
13 See supra note 12 and accompanying sources.
14 See Kaal, Evolution of Law, supra note 12.
15 See Kaal, supra note 6.
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elements in financial regulation could be facilitated through the increasing use
of institution specific information and private ordering. Contingent Capital
Securities (CoCos),16 Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs), Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs),17 venture capitalists’ finance allocation,18
and crowdfunding are among the governance mechanisms that can provide
institutions specific information for financial rulemaking.19
Professor Schwarcz’s work is foundational for the literature on remedies
for excessive risk-taking and provides much needed guidance for future
generations of scholars. He provides important insights into trends in the
literature and proposed scholarly solutions for shortcomings in the existing
regulatory framework and its role in excessive risk taking by executives.
Scholars like myself will be able to use his work and insights to delineate the
role of dynamic elements in financial regulation for many years to come.

16 See Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821
(2012); see also Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in
Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281 (2012).
17 See Kaal & Lacine, supra note 12.
18 Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive
Innovation (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
19 See Kaal, supra note 6.

